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This paper presents an analysis of contemporary neuropsychiatric meaning-making regarding
dementia, encompassing distinct beliefs, practices and objects, and the peculiarities of its
fragmented public manifestations. First, some core neuropsychiatric beliefs are discussed,
arguing that the designation of those beliefs as exceptional truths engenders an imperialist
ethic whereby the beliefs must be spread into other populations. Second, the enactment of
this spread through dementia awareness is considered, whereby people are presented as
having wrong beliefs to justify the promotion of alternative correct knowledge. Third, some
emerging contradictions within neuropsychiatric dementia are outlined, as moves toward
early diagnosis and “living well” sit uneasily beside notions of dementia as a frightening
epidemic. The paper concludes that this produces dissonant dementia wherein contradictory
meanings are held together. Finally, it is suggested that this dissonance will likely continue,
underpinned by specific interests.
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In this paper, we analyse neuropsychiatric meaning-makingregarding dementia, focusing on awareness initiatives as a keyfacet. We approach neuropsychiatric meaning-making via a
set of distinct beliefs, practices, and objects in which it is manifest.
Our argument proceeds in four stages. First, we discuss some core
neuropsychiatric beliefs and key characteristics that shape them.
We argue that the presentation of neuropsychiatric beliefs as
exceptional truths can engender an imperialist1 ethic whereby
those beliefs should be spread to other populations. Second, we
analyse the enactment of this spread through practices and
materials of dementia awareness, whereby people are presented as
having wrong beliefs to justify the promotion of correct knowledge.
Third, we attend to some contradictions within this neu-
ropsychiatric meaning-making, as the advocation of early diag-
nosis and “living well” sits uneasily beside the promotion of
dementia as a modern epidemic to be feared and fought. We
argue that the emergence of (relatively) able public figures diag-
nosed with dementia seemingly contradicts apocalyptic depic-
tions of dementia that some associated organisations invoke to
elicit funding. Consequently, cognitively impaired older adults
inhabit an ambiguous conceptual landscape—dissonant dementia.
Finally, we suggest that contemporary trajectories of dissonant
dementia will likely continue, reflecting on the interests under-
pinning these phenomena.
This paper offers critical comment on recent public outputs of
key dementia-related institutions, which we compare with our
pre-existing research to explore shared articulations of dementia.
The materials discussed herein were selected based on their being
targeted at the public and consequently being publicly available,
as this was deemed important to the proliferation of meaning.
They were also selected based on the relative prominence of the
associated organisations (e.g. the NHS, the Alzheimer’s Associa-
tion), which was similarly judged to be conducive to greater
propagation. We acknowledge, however, that size and reputation
need not necessarily equate to influence. Our argument is
informed by similar existing work on neuropsychiatry more
generally, which has delineated key features (e.g. binarism,
exceptionalism) (see Abi-Rached and Rose, 2010; Cooper, 2016;
Mills and Hilberg, 2019; Pickersgill, 2013; Williams et al., 2012;
Vidal and Ortega, 2017 outlined further below). This is not a
comprehensive account of all neuropsychiatric responses to
dementia based on a systematic review (indeed, it is doubtful that
that is possible), but instead is a critical commentary based on
grey literature, various dementia stakeholders and our own pre-
vious research projects. Therefore, our argument simply pertains
to a facet of neuropsychiatric enterprise that warrants critical
attention.
We evidence our arguments with contemporary examples from
leading British and international institutions, such as the National
Health Service, the National Institute of Health, the Alzheimer’s
Society and the Alzheimer’s Association. We provide comparable
examples from smaller initiatives to emphasise that dissonant
dementia is not limited to major organisations, but is also evident
in local projects, including social dementia research, which will be
of concern to our social scientific readership. Ultimately, we
provide a critical interpretation of select phenomena which, while
abundantly manifest in mainstream neuropsychiatric institutional
endeavours, are one aspect of more diverse issues that are
inevitably open to other interpretations. The commentary’s broad
scope is intended to provide a framework and provocation for
further debate and more minute analysis of specific elements of
neuropsychiatric dementia. Our approach reflects the critical
tradition’s (Bartlett and O’Connor, 2010; Zeilig, 2014) concern
with revealing seemingly neutral portrayals of phenomena in the
natural sciences as implicitly politicised, and challenging those
politicisations. Terminologically, then, this commentary mirrors
the implicit political labour of neuropsychiatric meaning-making
as a means of both highlighting and contesting that labour. Zeilig
(2014) notes that “a range of emotionally charged metaphors
about dementia pervades the popular imagination, and these are
found in newspaper accounts, political speeches, and in both
documentary and feature films.” We similarly address literary
neuropsychiatric materials, e.g. advertisements and assessment
scales, highlighting how neuropsychiatric imaginings of dementia
serve certain political ends. Where Zeilig has uncovered the more
emotive portrayals of dementia in terms of war and disaster, we
attend to the seemingly more impartial neuropsychiatric pro-
ductions, highlighting similar meaning-making processes within
depictions that are often considered neutral, and the ways in
which they can become dissonant.
Finally, while pertaining to dementia as a specific example of
neuropsychiatric-public meaning-engagements, we hope that
social scientists working in other areas will find our arguments
relevant to their own interests. In particular, the dementia
enterprise that we depict in this paper echoes wider considera-
tions of later life (ill-)health that garner much scholarly, public
and governmental attention in the wider context of ageing welfare
states. Moreover, those familiar with the wider critical literature
dealing with neuropsychiatry as a broad entity will hopefully find
an interesting example of the application of those ideas to a
specific topic that, while of considerable societal import, is often
overshadowed by greater attentiveness to other neuropsychiatric
conditions. To some extent, we intend two different payoffs for
two different communities—dementia studies scholars appre-
ciating the application of unfamiliar arguments to a familiar
topic, and other social scientists appreciating an application of
familiar arguments to an unfamiliar topic.
“Neuropsychiatry”—who, what, when?
“Neuropsychiatry” is an elusive term (Sachdev and Mohan, 2013).
For clarity, we use Berrios and Marková’s (2002, p. 629) historical
analysis of neuropsychiatry as defined by the “foundational claim”
that “mental disorders are disorders of the brain.” Building on this
claim, core neuropsychiatric beliefs regarding dementia include
that it is a syndrome of cognitive decline caused by discrete
neuropathologies that are distinct from ageing, and that not
enough people are aware of this. Furthermore, because dementia is
caused by disease, and biomedical sciences have cured some dis-
eases, dementia is a technoscientific challenge that will be solved
through technoscientific endeavours (Manthorpe and Iliffe, 2016).
Fletcher (2020a) notes that dementia is cast as “a grave neuro-
pathological problem to be overcome through biomedical
research. Suggestions are repeatedly made that such research will
eventually produce curative therapeutics.” Associated practices
correspond to these beliefs. As with other ways of understanding
the world, neuropsychiatry distinguishes the normal (ageing) and
the abnormal (dementia) (see Lock (2013) on Canguilhem, nor-
mality and Alzheimer’s disease). That intellectual division has
typically been enacted numerically (Wilson, 2014), through cog-
nitive batteries that quantify cognitive abilities and establish
diagnostic thresholds, e.g. the mini mental state examination,
representing objects of neuropsychiatric meaning-making and
transfer (Folstein et al., 1975). Beliefs regarding future tech-
noscientific solutions are manifest in practices of science com-
munication and resource accumulation via advertising campaigns
(Fletcher, 2021a). Thus, a neuropsychiatric dementia is manifest in
beliefs (e.g. future cures), practices (e.g. fundraising) and objects
(e.g. cognitive batteries). This is not an exhaustive typology of
components, but rather a useful indication of some sociologically
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recognisable key factors to facilitate our analysis. Below, we argue
that certain tensions within and between these considerations in
combination can create forms of dissonance.
The “neuropsychiatric” term requires two important caveats.
First, we must acknowledge the genealogy of contemporary
neuropsychiatry and its specific relations to dementia. While we
are primarily interested in phenomena that emerged during the
late-20th century, dementia has garnered neuroscientific and
psychiatric interest for over a century. For example, early-19th
century anatomical work (Fuller, 1911, 1912) attended explicitly
to the question of dementia’s neuropathological genesis. More-
over, the broader history of “neuropsychiatry” stretches back into
the 17th century, albeit in several unconnected forms (Berrios
and Marková, 2002). Abi-Rached and Rose (2010) have argued
that the neurosciences in their current form emerged in the 1960s
as a hybrid of earlier psychiatric and neuroscientific endeavours.
Of particular relevance to this paper is the proliferation of the
“neuromolecular gaze”, an epistemological shift wherein phe-
nomena such as “cognition”, “behaviour” and “memory” became
fundamentally molecular matters. This shift catalysed researchers,
charities, governments and publics around common notions of
the biologic brain as an answer to life itself. The neuromolecular
gaze is now widespread in “regular newspaper articles and tele-
vision programmes… accompanied by vibrant visual illustrations
derived from brain imaging of the living brain in action as it
thinks, feels, decides, and desires” (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013).
Pickersgill (2013) has similarly charted the historic proliferation
of neuroscience in particular as a basis for generating simulta-
neous societal and self-knowledge. Vidal and Ortega (2017) have
charted the post-1990s making of the “cerebral subject”, wherein
we are increasingly prone to neuro-centric self-conceptualisation,
as well as the concurrent rise of sociological analyses of various
neuro enterprises. The phenomena discussed in this paper can be
read as a component of this epistemological shift.
We are primarily focused on the post-1970s emergence of what
Fox (1989) identifies as the “Alzheimer’s disease movement”
(outlined more recently by Lock (2013)), which developed around
the promotion of a specific disease-model of dementia, grounded
in neuropsychiatric authority. By employing science commu-
nication strategies echoing earlier approaches to cancer, a coali-
tion of researchers, charities, advocates and governments have
transformed the meaning of dementia over five decades. Begin-
ning with researchers, various social and natural scientists have
coalesced around neuropsychiatric dementia as a catalyst for new
research programmes. Many research publications open with
appeals to the problem of dementia as a neuropsychiatric disorder
with global ramifications, emphasising the importance of the
work therein. Charities have used similar notions of dementia to
campaign for more resources, often later redistributed to research
projects. Various notable advocates have supported this enter-
prise, both popular media celebrities and individuals who have
become known for having dementia, using their personal profiles
to publicise initiatives. Governments have also propagated neu-
ropsychiatric dementia, politicising it as a major social concern,
particularly regarding state welfare (Innes, 2009). British Prime
Minister David Cameron instigated a range of dementia-focussed
initiatives during his time in office, including financially incen-
tivising diagnosis. Finally, it is worth considering the role of the
pharmaceutical industry. It is a major material promoter of
neuropsychiatric dementia, financing associated drug research
(Cummings et al., 2020; Lock, 2013), but is also a victim to some
extent, having lost vast sums in pursuit of promissory cures (Lo,
2018). This highlights distinct possibilities for benefitting from
neuropsychiatric dementia—both today (researchers, charities,
advocates) and tomorrow (governments, pharma). This dementia
movement, broadly conceived, has popularised a distinct set of
beliefs, practices and objects that structure contemporary insti-
tutional and personal understandings of, and responses to,
dementia. Hence, while the professional neuropsychiatric history
of dementia stretches back to the 19th century, the particular
iteration discussed herein is more recent.
Second, neuropsychiatry is not the exclusive domain of neu-
roscientists and psychiatrists, but instead includes the various
stakeholders mentioned above. Indeed, as Lock (2013) has
observed, these diverse stakeholders may not even necessarily
agree fully on the precise meaning of dementia and what action
that meaning might necessitate. Charities play a particularly
important role in sustaining and promoting neuropsychiatric
meanings, because their existence depends on persuading donors
that neuropsychiatry will provide solutions to dementia, given
sufficient donations. Moreover, (Fletcher, 2020b) has noted that
many social scientists are embedded within and perpetuate neu-
ropsychiatric dementia, suggesting that “social research often
seems to be dancing to neuropsychiatry’s tune.” Similarly, Cohen
(1998) argued that social scientists who self-identified as working
on “dementia” or “Alzheimer’s”, as opposed to “senility”, con-
tributed to the neuropsychiatric reconstruction of cognitive
decline in later life. Therefore, neuropsychiatry is not rigidly
institutionalised or unequivocally demarcated, and hence our
argument encompasses an assortment of examples.
Moreover, Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) note that, over the past
half-century neuropsychiatry has seeped out of the lab, and into
public life and popular culture, so that we increasingly conceive of
ourselves and our problems in neuropsychiatric terms. It is this
spread of neuropsychiatric meanings, beyond related professions
and into public life, which warrants critical attention. As Williams
et al. (2012, p. 65) note in relation to ageing and cognition:
Neuroculture is not simply a question of the power or
persuasive appeal of the neurosciences within the labora-
tory or clinic, but of their wider social, cultural, political
and economic salience and significance about the future of
humanity.
Therefore, we do not focus on the machinations of neu-
roscientific and psychiatric professions within institutional set-
tings. Instead, we are principally concerned with the
manifestations and ramifications of an associated amalgam of
meanings in the public sphere. To chart this realisation, we will
deconstruct some of the beliefs, practices and objects bound up
with that amalgam, before considering what it means for the
contemporary status of cognitive decline. Ultimately, we argue
that it creates a dissonant dementia, simultaneously spanning
several seemingly contradictory meanings.
Extending neuropsychiatric “Knowledge” over public
“Beliefs”
For the purposes of this discussion, we focus on key neu-
ropsychiatric beliefs that dementia is: (1) a syndrome caused by
discrete neuropathologies; (2) distinct from normal ageing; (3)
curable by future neuropsychiatric interventions given sufficient
public donations to facilitate technoscientific advances; (4) mis-
understood by a public in need of education. Related claims
populate various charity websites:
There are a large number of underlying conditions which
cause the symptoms of dementia, as a result of changes that
happen in the brain (ADI, 2020b).
Dementia is not a natural part of ageing (Alzheimer’s
Society, 2017).
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The path to effective new treatments for dementia is
through increased research funding and increased partici-
pation in clinical studies (Alzheimer’s Association, 2020).
Greater awareness and understanding of dementia is
important to challenge the myths and misconceptions that
surround the condition (ADI, 2020a).
Neuropsychiatric stakeholders often adopt exceptionalist stan-
ces toward these beliefs, attributing to them unique merit and
hence superiority. Berrios and Marková (2002) have argued that
this assertion of exclusive beliefs is a defining characteristic of
neuropsychiatry, itself a driver of contradiction given that the
presentation of certainty is set against a backdrop of considerable
uncertainty regarding the brain and mental disorder (Bosco et al.,
2019). This exceptionalism is evident in common proclamations
that neuropsychiatric beliefs are the legitimate depiction of rea-
lity, in contrast to non-neuropsychiatric beliefs that are presented
as misconstruing dementia. Consider the following Alzheimer’s
Research UK advertisement:
“Dementia is not a natural part of ageing. It’s caused by
physical diseases, most commonly Alzheimer’s” (ARUK,
2019b, emphasis original).
This NHS information takes a similar approach:
“It’s also important to remember that dementia is not a
natural part of ageing. What is dementia? Dementia is a
syndrome (a group of related symptoms) associated with an
ongoing decline of brain functioning” (NHS, 2020).
This contrast reveals a certain neuropsychiatric binarism, evi-
dent in the articulation of beliefs through a true/false language,
demarcating what dementia is (i.e. neuropsychiatric beliefs) in
contrast to what other groups mistakenly believe it to be. Con-
sider the component arguments of the above quote: “Dementia is
not…” and “It’s caused by…” (ARUK, 2019b), creating an
absolute contrast between reality and fallacy. The word “belief”
can be instrumental here. For instance, Alzheimer’s Research UK
state that “22% still incorrectly believe that dementia is an
inevitable part of old age” (ARUK, 2019a, emphasis added). The
use of “believe” distinguishes those meanings from factual
meanings, creating an epistemic hierarchy within which one
group’s knowledge (i.e. fact) is superior to another’s belief (i.e.
fiction) (Cooper, 2016). Such strong assertions of truth and falsity
correspond strongly with the blurred physiological boundaries
between ageing and dementia, which Lock (2013) identifies as one
of the key ontological battlegrounds in the recent history of
Alzheimer’s. As we will show below, the projected truthfulness of
neuropsychiatric knowledge can exacerbate dissonance when
knowledges become contradictory.
Non-neuropsychiatric beliefs are not limited to relations
between dementia and ageing. For example, Berwald and col-
leagues’ (2016) research on “Black African and Caribbean British
communities’ perceptions of memory problems” found that
participants considered dementia to be “a white person’s illness.”
The authors concluded that this non-neuropsychiatric belief was
problematic and should be challenged through interventions to
teach these communities neuropsychiatric knowledge. The belief/
knowledge binary often traces ethnic classifications in this man-
ner. A recent report on dementia and minority ethnic populations
by Alzheimer Europe (2018, p. 18) claimed that “in some cultural
and ethnic groups, beliefs about fate, evil spirits, the evil eye, lack
of faith in or punishment from God are common.” Again, the
authors argue such “beliefs” should be challenged by improving
neuropsychiatric “knowledge” via educational interventions. This
positioning of ethnicity in relation to dementia (see Fletcher,
2020c, 2021b; Fletcher et al., 2021) reveals a delineation of dif-
ferent types of person in reference to their purported amenability
to neuropsychiatric beliefs.
The knowledge/belief binary can provide justification for
epistemic imperialism. The identification of non-neuropsychiatric
populations, e.g. minority ethnic people, can demarcate them as
targets for intervention. Cooper (2016) has observed that the
discursive construction of binary psychiatric issues often reveals
power dynamics that permeate the meaning-making practices
through which mental health knowledge is targeted at new
populations. Indeed, mental health literacy has been criticised for
unreflectively accepting neuropsychiatric ‘gold standard’ knowl-
edge without taking into account alternative perspectives
(Holman, 2015). By “imperialism” we mean that the assumed
rightness of a belief-system can justify its extension over other
purportedly wrong beliefs (Cooper, 2016). Cooper (2016, p. 702)
observes of psychiatric research: “Value-judgements are most
pertinently revealed in the kinds of recommendations put for-
ward by many of the studies, where it is explicitly asserted that
interventions need to focus on “correcting” false cultural beliefs
and behaviours so they are more in line with a biomedical system
of knowledge.” Epistemic imperialism is realised in dementia
awareness initiatives, with interventions designed to spread
neuropsychiatric meanings to populations considered pro-
blematically non-compliant, ranging from the general public
(McParland et al., 2012), through to carers (Robinson et al., 2014)
and minority ethnic groups (Fletcher, 2020c). Proponents of
awareness initiatives contend that awareness deficits impede
diagnosis, denying people access to services, treatments and
clarity (Watson et al., 2018). It therefore follows that increasing
dementia awareness will lead to improvements in related out-
comes. While arguments for awareness promotion are contested
(Fletcher, 2021a; Fox et al., 2013; Milne, 2010; Samsi and
Manthorpe, 2014), we will not evaluate such debates here.
Instead, we wish to examine dementia awareness as a neu-
ropsychiatric endeavour that manifests select beliefs, practices
and objects.
The belief/knowledge binary, and the contradictions it con-
tains, represent an initial type of dissonance. As with other belief
systems, neuropsychiatric meanings offer some imposition of
order on a given phenomenon, in this case later life mental dis-
order. However, the neuropsychiatric ordering of dementia beliefs
is at odds with different understandings of ageing and/or evil
spirits (though claims regarding the latter’s prevalence may be
poorly evidenced racialised caricatures). Hence, neuropsychiatric
beliefs not only come into tension with public beliefs (Cahill et al.,
2015), but also with historical characterisations of dementia in
terms of ageing and/or moralities (Ballenger, 2006; Berchtold and
Cotman, 1998; Boller and Forbes, 1998). Perhaps more impor-
tantly, neuropsychiatric meanings can be at odds with people’s
experiences given that neuropsychiatric cures are currently pro-
missory. This begets ambiguity regarding “correct” knowledge,
and the consequent tensions are emblematic of the discordances
that characterise contemporary depictions of dementia. Such
ambiguity, driven by the contestating of non-neuropsychiatric
beliefs, is explored below regarding “Alzheimerised senility”.
Efforts to extend neuropsychiatric meanings to new popula-
tions are not simply a matter of ensuring that everybody holds the
right belief for its own sake, or some nefarious ploy to con people.
Ultimately, while aspects warrant critical analysis, neu-
ropsychiatric imperialism is largely fuelled by sincere commit-
ments to increasing human wellbeing and can point to a
substantial evidence base of comparable past successes. The
impetus to convert new populations to neuropsychiatric beliefs is
based on public health commitments to health literacy stemming
from historic successes in combatting disease and improving
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countless lives mental health through raising awareness, groun-
ded in laudable convictions that publicising certain knowledge
will improve population-level health (Fletcher, 2021a; Cahill,
2020; Rose, 2019). Historic examples of health literacy improving
health outcomes engender expectations that improved dementia
knowledge will beget better management (Noble et al., 2015). In
this vein, Noble et al. (2015, p. 73) claim that “dementia health
literacy is low among the public and likely poses a significant
barrier to Alzheimer’s disease symptom recognition and treat-
ment.” They argue that improved awareness could “shift cultural
perceptions of AD to improve its acceptance, and reduce barriers
to early diagnosis. Such a programme could have additional
relevance for early AD recognition should time-sensitive phar-
macologic and healthy lifestyle risk-reduction measures be proven
effective as disease-modifying strategies.” Moreover, from a sci-
ence communication perspective, neuropsychiatric enterprises
(e.g. research projects) often rely on public funding, and therefore
must convince the public of their worthiness (Simis et al., 2016).
Indeed, (Fletcher, 2020c, p. 708) notes that “the accrual of
resources, enacted through the promotion of certain notions and
the refutation of others, is woven throughout the dementia
awareness agenda.” This is achieved through promissory claims
that funding research will produce future cures (Martin, 2015;
Petersen and Krisjansen, 2015). Thus, neuropsychiatry can depict
a binary future, one fearful—the neuropathologic epidemic; the
other hopeful—the neuropsychiatric cure (Williams et al., 2012).
The coexistence of these futures in our present further promotes a
dissonant dementia, an observation expanded upon below.
Examples of beliefs regarding promissory science commu-
nication are abundant in the materials of associated organisations.
The National Institute of Health’s “Hope through Research”
education page claims: “Discoveries may eventually lead to ways
to slow disease progression or even cure and prevent the
dementias” (NIH, 2019). The promotion of curative faith is an
effective science communication practice because it justifies the
accumulation of resources by causally linking today’s sacrifices
(e.g. donations) with tomorrow’s utopias (e.g. cures) (Hacking,
1983). It also invokes an impressive intellectual heritage to justify
its own potential, highlighting previous examples of tech-
noscientific progress ameliorating human suffering, e.g. smallpox,
polio, HIV. Comparisons with cancer are important here because
the Alzheimer’s movement was inspired by cancer-related pro-
missory science (Fox, 1989). A recent Alzheimer’s Research UK
advertisement promoting an early detection study claimed: “Early
detection has transformed the treatment of cancers and heart
disease, and we can do the same for dementia” (ARUK, 2020).
Such promissory science beliefs, depicting the future fruits of
neuropsychiatric enterprise, are hence an instrumental bedrock of
neuropsychiatric enterprise.
Likewise, beliefs regarding public knowledge deficits are evi-
dent throughout the discursive productions of neuropsychiatric
dementia awareness. Alzheimer’s Disease International’s
announcement of its 2019 world report opened thus: “Results
from the world’s largest survey on attitudes to dementia reveals
[sic] a startling lack of global knowledge around dementia, with
two thirds of people still thinking the disease is a normal part of
ageing rather than a neurodegenerative disorder” (ADI, 2019b).
Following its release, this “startling” knowledge deficit was
employed as an awareness call-to-arms. The report was circu-
lated via social and news media to emphasise the exceptional
importance of neuropsychiatric beliefs in opposition to other
illegitimate beliefs (e.g. Andrews, 2019; Templeton, 2019). It is
worth stating unequivocally here that we are not treating any
knowledge as “correct” or “incorrect”. Instead, we are concerned
with how influential systems of meaning conjure notions of (in)
correctness, how those meanings are spread and, most
importantly, how they converge in an increasingly dissonant
dementia, explicated below.
Exemplifying the capacity for neuropsychiatry to define the
parameters of legitimate knowledge negotiation, Mills and Hil-
berg (2019) have explored the WHO’s mhGAP-Intervention
Guide. This tool facilitates the diagnosis and management of
common mental disorders in Low- and Middle-Income Countries
(LMICs), as an “inscription device” that promotes specific ima-
ginaries of mental disorder in new populations. The authors note
that appeals to the superiority of psychiatric and neuroscientific
“knowledge” position mental disorder as open to technical, rather
than epistemological, debate. Thus, the problem is rendered
negotiable, but the parameters of negotiation and the stakeholders
who have legitimacy to engage in negotiation are defined in
accordance with neuropsychiatric commitments. Mills and Hil-
berg (2019, pp. 166–167) term this “craft[ing] the epistemological
parameters of critique”, which effectively “exclud[es] alternative
conceptualisations from different worldviews.” Similar processes
are evident in neuropsychiatric dementia whereby, for instance,
the nature of specific causative neuropathologies is (somewhat)
open to debate, but the notion that dementias are attributable to
discrete neuropathologies is not legitimately contestable. Without
symbolic credentials (i.e. a doctorate) and languages (i.e. “amy-
loidogenic Aβ42”), various stakeholders in dementia are posi-
tioned outside the parameters of legitimate debate, with little
power to contribute to, let alone challenge, neuropsychiatric
meaning. In line with mhGAP, interventions are now targeting
LMICs as a site for the propagation of neuropsychiatric dementia
and its distinctive dissonance, discussed further below.
Extending meaning through practices and objects
Besides unpacking the beliefs that permeate them, we can also
analyse dementia awareness initiatives as a set of neuropsychiatric
practices that centre on core material objects. The enactment of
dementia awareness is evident in some substantial institutional
endeavours that we explore in this section. Such initiatives pro-
mote neuropsychiatric beliefs through binarism. They simulta-
neously undermine non-neuropsychiatric beliefs and advocate the
superiority of neuropsychiatric beliefs (Shinan-Altman and
Werner, 2019). These attempts to govern beliefs, suppressing
some and promoting others, constitute a notable neuropsychiatric
practice (Zhang, 2018). They are typically orchestrated by actors
outside of professional neuropsychiatry, e.g. charities, celebrities
and government figures, perpetuating the creep of neu-
ropsychiatric meaning into public life.
Exemplifying this neuropsychiatric creep are academic and
third sector attempts to quantify the dementia awareness of
certain populations. A growing research tradition seeks to mea-
sure awareness, representing an intriguing realisation of neu-
ropsychiatric expansion in seemingly mundane practices
(Fletcher et al., 2021). Practices of measuring dementia awareness,
typically articulated as “literacy”, are reliant on a range of mea-
surement tools to facilitate assessment. Low and Anstey’s (2009)
dementia literacy study used a vignette to assess recognition of
dementia. The vignette described someone with “the symptoms
and behaviours of a person meeting Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual [of Mental Disorders], fourth edition (DSM-IV) criteria
for Alzheimer’s disease” (Low and Anstey, 2009, p. 44). Further
questions were posed about the potential of dementia risk
reduction and causal factors. This method aimed to capture key
elements of dementia literacy, which are, according to their
definition, “knowledge and beliefs regarding dementia that aid
recognition, management or prevention” (Low and Anstey, 2009,
p. 33). Here, we see many discussed factors at play. Dementia
“knowledge” is predicated on formal neuropsychiatric materials
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(DSM-IV), and poor outcomes are attributed to poor knowledge.
This type of dementia literacy measurement is now a popular
research sub-tradition (see Annear et al., 2017; Bond et al., 2005;
Hudson et al., 2012; Lüdecke et al., 2016; McParland et al., 2012;
Purandare et al., 2007; Rimmer et al., 2005; Roberts et al., 2014).
Dementia literacy scales represent key neuropsychiatric objects,
and are instrumental in the extension of knowledge claims. Cri-
tiques of dementia literacy studies have touched on the lack of
definitions of “literacy” and its measurement tools (Choi et al.,
2018), and a lack of consistency across studies, regarding fun-
damental constructs and how knowledge is operationalized and
measured (Cahill et al., 2015; Spector et al., 2012). Less apparent
are critiques of the rationales underpinning the creation and
proliferation of such objects, and decisions regarding which facts
are included and which populations they are practiced upon. As a
result, these assessment scales, comprising key material objects of
dementia awareness and embodying some key neuropsychiatric
beliefs, are often treated as neutral measures of external phe-
nomena rather than influential tools that constrain the nature of
the entity to which they attend (Fletcher, 2020c).
Perhaps the most notable example of awareness-measurement
is the Alzheimer’s Disease International world report (ADI,
2019a), asking questions regarding whether dementia is a normal
part of ageing and whether it is caused by neurophysiological
changes. It was a sizeable global endeavour, incorporating almost
70,000 participants across 155 countries, evidencing a powerful
mobilisation of neuropsychiatric meaning through certain prac-
tices. This particular mobilisation may prove fundamental to the
prosperity of neuropsychiatric dementia over coming years,
providing statistical foundations for various arguments in support
of spreading awareness, which, as we explicate below, contributes
to dementia’s dissonance. In this manner, (Fletcher, 2020c) has
noted that assessing the awareness of various populations, and
invariably finding their beliefs wanting, is an important precursor
to secondary practices of awareness-raising. Fletcher (2020c, p.
712) concludes that that “awareness is used to justify the pro-
posed governance of minority ethnic conduct through interven-
tions explicitly seeking to re-educate and hence improve them.”
As such, “dementia awareness research can be understood as the
neuromolecular governance of life.”
As highlighted by Rose and Abi-Rached (2013), the extension
of neuropsychiatric meaning into public life creates new ways of
understanding ourselves and others in relation to our brains, their
molecular composition and associated diagnostic categories.
These practices of meaning-making are perhaps most strongly
evident in direct awareness-raising initiatives, that is, enterprises
that explicitly seek to ensure that more people hold neu-
ropsychiatric beliefs regarding dementia. One of the most high-
profile contemporary awareness initiatives is Alzheimer’s
Research UK’s #ShareTheOrange campaign. High-production
audio-visual materials, the core objects of awareness-raising
practices, are shared across various platforms promoting the
legitimacy of neuropsychiatric knowledge and the likelihood that
it will eradicate dementia if given sufficient resources. It
encourages audiences to spread its messaging through reposting
advertisements, hence the “#Share” component. At the time of
writing, over two million people have shared the content (ARUK,
2019b).
Another popular British awareness initiative is the Alzheimer’s
Society’s “Dementia Friends” scheme (Dementia Friends, 2017).
Dementia Friends aims to improve the everyday lives of people
with dementia through making the general population more
understanding of their impairments and requirements. While the
in-depth initiation involves a face-to-face session of 45 min, there
is a briefer online process whereby a person watches a short video
and subsequently receives a badge. This online option likely goes
some way toward explaining the creation of three million
Dementia Friends (Dementia Friends, 2019). This is an unusually
explicit form of neuropsychiatric expansion to new populations
because those targeted are quite literally (re)labelled and (re)
badged. The Dementia Friends scheme has five core messages,
including “dementia is not a normal part of ageing” and
“dementia is caused by diseases of the brain”. Thus, fundamental
neuropsychiatric beliefs are central to the initiative, despite a
purported focus on creating a society that is more accom-
modating toward those living with dementia. The implication
here is that people’s actions toward people with dementia are
improved when they believe that dementia is abnormal and
pathological, a logic returned to below in our discussion of
dissonance.
Not all awareness campaigns entail nationwide programmes
underpinned by largescale institutional infrastructures. Various
smaller endeavours also exist, with an emerging focus on young
people and minority ethnic groups. The “Kids4Dementia” pro-
gramme is designed to change children’s dementia beliefs in
regional Australian schools (Baker et al., 2018); “Dementia
Detectives” is a one-hour awareness session aimed at secondary
school students (Parveen et al., 2015); the “Psycho-educational
Intervention for African American Caregivers” is comprised of
twelve 90-min “modules” of dementia literacy for African
Americans (Morano and King, 2010); and the fotonovelas
“Unidos en la Lucha” and “Que le Pasa a Abuelito” are small
booklets designed to educate Latinos in the US (Valle et al., 2006).
As with #ShareTheOrange and Dementia Friends, these smaller
initiatives are relatively explicit in their attempts to spread neu-
ropsychiatric meanings to populations deemed potentially non-
compliant. They seem to be broadly successful on their own
terms, having reported improved concordance with neu-
ropsychiatric beliefs among recipients.
In light of the self-reported success of awareness initiatives in
combatting certain beliefs and promoting others, it is important
to qualify commonplace claims regarding the binarism of beliefs,
whereby people either subscribe to neuropsychiatric beliefs or do
not. Various authors have sought to characterise dementia beliefs
along the same categorical lines as those at the heart of neu-
ropsychiatric culture (e.g. Clare et al., 2016; Quinn et al.,
2017, 2018). Clare and colleagues (2016) have used cluster ana-
lysis to categorise people affected by dementia into distinct
groups who consider their dementias to result from either illness
or ageing. Thus, even the methodologies of associated research
manifest a type of knowledge binarism, with cluster analysis
providing a particularly direct example due to its focus on dis-
creet typification (see Romesburg, 2004).
In response to such claims, it is important to acknowledge that
an individual’s beliefs are often more complex in practice. The
binary notion that one group holds disease-model beliefs and
another group holds senility-model beliefs is misleadingly simple.
(Fletcher, 2020a) has observed composite dementia beliefs among
people affected by dementia, noting that “their meanings were
variable combinations of diffuse aspects of biomedicine, ageing,
personality and comorbidity, couched within broader notions of
uncertainty and semi-naturalised decline.” These beliefs, labelled
Alzheimerised senility, resemble longstanding traditional beliefs
conflating dementia and ageing, but are articulated through a
partially neuropsychiatric language centring on the brain, as well
as implicating elements of personality. Fletcher (2020a) suggests
that, while the 1970s neuropathological conceptualisation of
dementia may represent something of a paradigm shift at an
institutional level, in the lives of people affected by dementia, be
that in terms of treatments, meanings or lived experiences, “it has
been more of a gradual infusion.” The lack of treatment options
means that neuropsychiatric institutions are relatively uninvolved
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in the lives of people affected by dementia. Fletcher found that, in
lieu of neuropsychiatric solutions, participants created their own
hybrid systems of meaning for ordering their dementias, based on
neuropsychiatric, lay and personal meanings. These findings echo
Pickersgill’s (2013) work on neuroscience more broadly, arguing
that, while from certain perspectives neuroscience has become a
dominant engine of public understanding, for many groups the
effects are not so pronounced. Hence, neuropsychiatry “neither
hegemonic nor monolithic and serves various, sometimes
incompatible interests and values” (Vidal and Ortega, 2017, p. 4).
Recognition of potential uneven and contradictory developments
of neuro-creep highlights the ambiguous terrains of meaning that
can emerge from neuropsychiatric creep when its knowledge
claims are somewhat at odds with people’s experiences, and it is
to this ambiguity that we now turn.
Dissonant dementia
So far, we have outlined a seemingly coherent and rather neat
neuropsychiatric iteration of dementia that exists as a notable
component of the wider dementia landscape. In this section, we
discuss what neuropsychiatric creep into the public sphere means
for cognitive decline in later life today, before considering how it
might shape the future. It is here that the neat dementia meanings
described above are contaminated by, and themselves con-
taminate, a mass of plural, fragmented and often contradictory
dementias. The process described herein hence mirrors a growing
recognition across medical social science of complex gradual
syntheses occurring between technical and lay understandings of
health and illness (Weiner et al., 2017). We argue that, through
the expansion of certain beliefs and practices, neuropsychiatry
can transform dementia into an ambiguous entity, a dissonant
dementia, one that is several seemingly contradictory things at the
same time, the British public’s most feared condition, yet one
with which people are living well. We suggest that these contra-
dictions are likely to continue in the immediate future. Finally, we
pay critical attention to some of the political implications of this
dissonant dementia. We ask why related endeavours focus on
legitimising and promoting a symbolism of normality and
abnormality, rather than advocating for changes that could
improve people’s lives more immediately and practically.
Throughout, we use “dissonance” literally to denote a lack of
harmony between different things.
The first neuropsychiatric contribution to a dissonant
dementia is the promotion of early diagnosis, bound up with
clinical trial setbacks and biomarker research, discussed further
below. Over recent years, neuropsychiatric stakeholders have
advocated early diagnosis in response to dementia (Brayne and
Kelly, 2019). A notable example was the Department of Health’s
2014 pledge to pay GPs £55 per dementia diagnosis to increase
diagnosis rates, a much derided and ultimately short-lived scheme
(Bell et al., 2015). Dementia diagnosis promotion does appear to
be working, with the number of people diagnosed in the UK
doubling between 2005 and 2015 (Donegan et al., 2017). The
spread of earlier diagnosis creates a new population of people
with dementia who are relatively young and cognitively able
compared with those previously diagnosed at later stages. Con-
sequently, the move toward early diagnosis has produced a
younger and well-er dementia, brought into advertising cam-
paigns as a means of presenting a more socially palatable
dementia—“a sanitised presentation of dementia… a purer
dementia, uncontaminated” (Fletcher, 2021a, p. 421).
A fascinating aspect of this process is the emergence of tensions
between expertise by ‘lived’ experience and expertise by profes-
sion. Perhaps the most explicit examples of this are the social
media battles between prominent neuropsychiatrists and activists
(Fletcher, 2019). Over recent years, some dementia activist groups
have drawn on disability politics to promote their causes,
resulting in the creation of well-known people with dementia who
are seemingly younger and more able than traditional stereotypes
of people with dementia. Their public profile has partially
changed the nature of dementia, expanding it to encompass new
notions of “living well”, and this has prompted aggressive back-
lash from members of the traditional neuropsychiatric commu-
nity. Related professionals have publicly denounced people who
they consider misdiagnosed (Howard, 2017; Hu, 2017). Such
arguments are infused, both explicitly and implicitly, with pre-
scriptions of what dementia really is and what authentic pre-
sentations look like. Fletcher (2019) critiques the exclusivist
approaches on display in such clashes, noting that “each side
argues as though they are contesting a fixed entity that is not
properly understood by the other… Commentators jostle to
declare what dementia is and is not, but nobody has such
answers.” What is especially ironic about this often fractious
assertion of (il)legitimacy is that the existence of unusually able
dementia activists is partly a product of diagnostic expansion,
both generally and specifically into earlier disease-stages. As with
Frankenstein and his monster, this particular neuropsychiatric
initiative has created its own foe, and in doing so has invigorated
traditional sociological questions regarding configurations of
power and knowledge when defining and attributing medical
conditions (Busfield, 2017).
The emergence of a younger, well-er, and generally more
positive dementia, fuels dissonance because diagnostic expansion
goes hand-in-hand with promissory science appeals to the gravity
of dementia as a problem (Burke, 2017). The post-1970s alarmist
publicisation of dementia, as a modern epidemic imperilling
societies, has been key to neuropsychiatric self-justification. Based
on the National Institute of Health’s use of cancer in the post-war
period, neuropsychiatric stakeholders in the late 20th century
weaponised cognitive decline in later life to substantiate their
existence (see Fox, 1989). The traditional argument has been that
dementia will be ruinous, but that neuropsychiatry can prevent
that fate. As a marketing enterprise this has been successful—the
number of dementia researchers in the UK almost doubled
between 2009 and 2015 (ARUK, 2017)—but its success has
coincided with dementia becoming the British public’s most
feared illness (Alzheimer’s Society, 2016). This trajectory exem-
plifies the difficulties of raising societal concern about a health
condition without scaremongering (Fletcher, 2021a; Devlin et al.,
2007). To this end, Fletcher (2021a, p. 422) cautions that well-
intentioned “campaigns risk positioning dementia as a substantial
societal problem and portraying people with dementia as excep-
tional, widely abused and in need of special treatment, ultimately
othering dementia.” Consequently, the increasingly positive
dementia of early diagnosis sits alongside an increasingly negative
dementia of promissory science.
Neuropsychiatric emphasis on pathological causation may
exacerbate these seemingly contradictory dementias. Pathologi-
sation purportedly minimises “stigma”, removing blame from the
individual in a moralistic sense and attributing it to molecular
processes beyond the person’s control (Cations et al., 2017).
There is ongoing debate regarding whether the attribution of
mental illness to discrete pathologies frees the individual from
blame and renders them a victim, or whether it leads to those
affected being more feared and reviled because they are diseased
and beyond salvation (Fletcher, 2020a, 2021a). However, Fletcher
(2021a, p. 422) observes that “while this debate remains unsettled,
dementia advocates typically take a hard-line approach, cham-
pioning the pathological model.” The case of cognitive decline in
later life is even more uncertain, because neuropsychiatric prac-
tices often refute notions of dementia as “normal” or “natural.”
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This leads to difficult questions regarding normality, pathology
and stigma in dementia: Does it makes sense to approach nor-
malisation as a form of stigmatisation? And can replacing nor-
malisation with pathologisation destigmatise a phenomenon?
Such questions are beyond the scope of this paper. We solely wish
to highlight that pathologisation is an important (if not the most
important) part of the contemporary neuropsychiatric awareness
agenda (Fletcher, 2021a), and that commentators dispute whether
it increases positive and/or negative imaginings of dementia.
The dementia that emerges from the contemporary maelstrom
of early diagnosis, awareness raising, alarmism and pathologisa-
tion is a strange hybrid—on the one hand, a disability to be
surmounted through friendliness and adaptation; on the other, a
modern epidemic with potentially ruinous implications for our
societies. Equally complicated is the partial creep of neu-
ropsychiatric meanings into public life, so that people can inhabit
worlds of meaning that draw on senility-neuropathology hybrids.
Dementia has hence become many different, sometimes contra-
dictory, things. The macro level creation of a dissonant dementia
echoes the emergence of Alzheimerised senility within the worlds
of meaning of people affected by dementia. This entanglement of
the cultural and the individual demonstrates the creeping influ-
ence of neuropsychiatry over our comprehension of cognitive
decline in later life. While the component meanings of a post-
1970s neuropsychiatric dementia are dissonant, one could argue
that in sum they position dementia as an increasingly present and
potent feature of public life (see Swinnen and Schweda, 2015, p.
10 on the “dementia boom”). The immediate dissonance of a
dementia that is simultaneously worse and better than ever before
is hence potentially conducive to the general proliferation of a
neuropsychiatric dementia.
There is longstanding recognition of the potential contra-
diction that stakeholders in health-promotion, e.g. charities, must
navigate when propagating disease imageries. Dire warnings
backed by statistics and depictions of suffering can garner
attention effectively, but can also fuel fear and revulsion. Appeals
to “friendly” enabling environments and living well can suggest
that the problem is readily surmountable, but can also undermine
arguments for dedicating resources to pharmaceutical develop-
ment and diagnosis promotion. Moreover, pathologisation can
simultaneously minimise moral blame and exacerbate the severity
of the threat posed. Overall, neuropsychiatric meanings can be
presented as absolute fact against a backdrop of generally poor
scientific understandings of ageing, neurophysiology, cognition
and mental disorder. This cacophony of dissonant meanings can
also be at odds with the lived experiences of people affected by
dementia. A lack of treatments and services renders the practical
experience of dementia today ostensibly identical to the experi-
ence of senility fifty years ago. This raises questions about making
sense of a later life lived with cognitive impairment, when the
available meanings for ordering that experience can be tumul-
tuous and contradictory. The interpretive ground beneath our
feet is shifting, with (Fletcher, 2019) noting that “dementia may
well be unrecognisable in a decade.” The intensification of dis-
sonance will potentially continue in the immediate future for
several reasons, an issue to which we will now turn.
Critical reflections on the future
Moving forward through the tangle of neuropsychiatric mean-
ings, we now consider dementia’s possible futures, and offer some
critical comment on the interests underpinning these trajectories.
Principally, we contend that the dissonant dementia described
herein will likely continue given two emerging trajectories. First,
the sustained development of a pre-symptomatic dementia will
generate more cognitively able people with dementia. Second,
heightened neuropsychiatric attentiveness toward LMICs will
expand dementia alarmism into new populations, stoking public
fears. Ultimately, dementia scholars must reflect on why this is
happening and whether current trajectories might be altered in
pursuit of preferable futures.
The younger, well-er dementia may continue through the
development of pre-symptomatic dementia classifications. The
promotion of early diagnosis as a strategy for addressing
dementia is being fuelled by the failure of clinical trials based on
the dominant “amyloid cascade hypothesis” model of Alzheimer’s
disease (Hardy and Higgins, 1992). In response, neuropsychia-
trists have suggested that pathological processes may begin dec-
ades before symptoms first become evident, and therefore
treatment must begin much earlier to be effective. This con-
ceptual pre-symptomatic shift has driven a race to develop pre-
symptomatic diagnostic biomarkers (Apter et al., 2015). Such
developments, born of an amyloid cascade hypothesis that some
deem “too big to fail”, are incentivised by key stakeholders
(Castellani and Smith, 2011). For example, pharmaceutical
companies funded studies encouraging the British government to
financially incentivise early diagnosis in 2013 (Le Couteur et al.,
2013). Substantial financial interests are reliant on the expansion
of dementia diagnosis, with the number of people taking anti-
dementia medications more than doubling between 2005 and
2015 (Donegan et al., 2017). There is little to suggest that these
interests will change in the immediate future. Therefore, as
diagnosis expands ever earlier, the population of people diag-
nosed with dementia but lacking overt symptoms will likely
increase.
On the other side of dementia’s ambiguous future, recent
increases in public fear will likely continue through the expansion
of dementia into LMICs. The success of neuropsychiatric ima-
ginings of dementia during the late-20th century was largely
limited to high-income countries (HICs). Of 19 countries with
national dementia plans in 2015, 16 were HICs (WHO, 2015). Of
37 countries with prevalence data in 2012, 23 were HICs (WHO,
2012). LMICs now provide fertile terrain for the expansion of a
neuropsychiatric dementia into new populations, part of a
broader globalisation of neuropsychiatry via the Global Mental
Health movement (Kirmayer et al., 2015; Mills, 2014; Rose, 2019).
This is evident in the rush to quantify dementia through global
epidemiological projects, providing justification for greater neu-
ropsychiatric practice (e.g. Prince et al., 2007, 2016). Such projects
have precedents. Neuropsychiatric dementia has always relied on
epidemiology to emphasise its importance. Early claims in the
1970s that Alzheimer’s was the 4th biggest killer in the US were
grounded in novel uses of epidemiology as a source of statistical
justification (Fletcher, 2020a; Fox, 1989). It seems probable that,
just as the expansion of neuropsychiatric imaginings of dementia
in HICs coincided with rising public fear, so their proliferation in
LMICs will be echoed in growing fear throughout those countries.
Considering these potential futures, critical scholars must draw
attention to the political interests and associated normative claims
at stake in neuropsychiatric trajectories. In particular, this
requires a focus on powerful stakeholders who define and benefit
from producing certain types of meaning and practice. As dis-
cussed, much dementia awareness-raising centres on spreading
neuropsychiatric beliefs—that dementia is caused by discrete
neuropathologies, is distinct from normal old age, etc. (e.g. WHO,
2019). Critical attention should be focused on which groups are
best served by this portrayal. It is telling that awareness raising
campaigns reiterate that dementia is a physical disease (and by
extension that donating money to certain organisations will yield
cures) but are far less concerned with informing people about
their legal entitlements to services. We might ask which aware-
ness would be more useful to those affected by dementia—
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knowing that Alzheimer’s is caused by protein aggregation, or
knowing how to access financial transfers for care provision? We
might also ask which of these literacies is more conducive to
encouraging research and charity donations, while limiting state
welfare expenditure. Such questions also warrant reflection on
issues of agency. The history of neuropsychiatric dementia cer-
tainly contains some suspect actions. For instance, Fox (1989) has
documented intentionally alarmist lobbying tactics, purposefully
orchestrated in the interests of resource accrual (though one
could argue that even the explicit pursuit of resources is often
principally motivated by commitments to using those resources
for laudable ends). However, it is important to recognise that the
processes outlined in this paper are generally not directly attri-
butable to any particular agents, but rather emanate from a
cacophony of actors and activities under the influence of multi-
faceted motivations and an overarching commitment to
improving the circumstances of people affected by dementia.
A final point for reflection, provoked by this paper, is whether
a dementia counterculture might be desirable, and if so, what it
might entail? In answer, it is first worth noting neuropsychiatric
dementia’s detrimental ramifications. Exploring the power of
neuropsychiatric dementia, Burke (2015, p. 24) observes:
The way we talk and think about dementia today is
inseparable from the assimilation of a disease model… [T]
his shift in thinking, buttressed by a nexus of institutional
practices, research agenda, and economic pressures and
interests, has profound effects upon the perception of
experience of living with this condition.
This generative capacity of neuropsychiatric meanings has
created a range of “new problems”, including the legitimation of
ethically dubious practices, the commodification of affect (and
perhaps of “life itself”, or even “love itself”), the positioning of
dementia as a complex expert concern from which experiential
expertise is excluded (Burke, 2015), and a basis for predictions of
societal collapse (Falcus and Sako, 2019). We therefore suggest
that some conceptual push-back is desirable.
Considering these problems, Falcus and Sako (2019) have
called for novel representations of dementia that challenge
mainstream imageries. Their recent book details a collection of
scholarship that already does so, albeit on the peripheries of
dementia research and the public imaginary. Meeks (2020) has
charted contemporary “neuro-crime fiction” which engages with
and subverts the neuropsychiatric turn through narratives that
emphasise its inherent tensions and lead audiences to question
mainstream neuropsychiatry. This approach offers a potential
strategy for effective resistance, and certainly warrants further
concerted academic attention. A critical dementia scholarship
must nurture a dementia that readily encompasses experiential
tensions, such as jointly respecting suffering and living well, while
avoiding the dissonance evident in simultaneous alarmism and
celebration. To achieve these ends, it is vital that scholars chal-
lenge spurious neuropsychiatric truth claims, binary knowledge/
belief appeals, and imperialistic engagements with alternative
meanings. It is perhaps this exclusivity above all else that renders
contemporary neuropsychiatric dementia dissonant, wherein the
assertion of what dementia is and is not leaves little room for the
real-world ambiguities that characterise mental disorder in
later life.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shone a light on several facets of a con-
temporary neuropsychiatric dementia to explore the multi-
dimensional issue of its potential dissonance. We have shown
how neuropsychiatric beliefs are treated as exceptional truths,
engendering a binary epistemic hierarchy whereby correct neu-
ropsychiatric knowledges are contrasted against incorrect non-
neuropsychiatric beliefs. Those assessed as holding non-
neuropsychiatric beliefs are typically presented as knowledge-
deficient, in need of educational interventions, justifying an
imperialistic approach to expanding neuropsychiatric meanings.
Efforts to measure these inadequate beliefs, and to promote
superior neuropsychiatric beliefs, permeate numerous dementia
awareness initiatives. Such endeavours are facilitated by assess-
ment scales and high-production advertisements, and are
underpinned by promissory science appeals to better futures.
Thus, in dementia awareness we can perceive the beliefs, practices
and objects of a distinct neuropsychiatric system of meaning.
We have argued that the creep of neuropsychiatric meaning
into public life creates new modes of understanding ourselves and
others, but that associated efforts to instil certain types of
meaning are only partially successful in generating ardent neuro-
enthusiasts. This partiality is indicative of the dissonant dementia
that has emerged from contemporary neuropsychiatric endea-
vours, a dementia that is several seemingly contradictory things
simultaneously. The dissonance of this novel dementia will likely
continue because of contemporary trends in the expansion of
neuropsychiatry. Though problematic in several respects, this
trajectory of expansion is partially supported by the substantial
interests of various powerful stakeholders. Ultimately, neu-
ropsychiatric treatments of dementia warrant greater critical
analysis given the increasing influence that they exert in public
life, the interests that underpin their proliferation, and the range
of possibilities that they open up and shut down.
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1 We use “imperialism” not as a derisory critique, but rather to denote the moral
impetus to extend power.
References
Abi-Rached JM, Rose N (2010) The birth of the neuromolecular gaze. Hist Hum
Sci 23(1):11–36
ADI (2019a) World Alzheimer report 2019: attitudes to dementia. Alzheimer’s
Disease International, London
ADI (2019b) World’s largest dementia study reveals two thirds of people think
dementia is a normal part of ageing, rather than a medical condition. https://
www.alz.co.uk/media/190920. Accessed 24 Oct 2019
ADI (2020a) About dementia. https://www.alz.co.uk/about-dementia. Accessed 4
Feb 2020
ADI (2020b) Types of dementia. https://www.alz.co.uk/info/types-of-dementia.
Accessed 04 Feb 2020
Alzheimer Europe (2018) The development of intercultural care and support for
people with dementia from minority ethnic groups. Alzheimer Europe,
Luxembourg
Alzheimer’s Association (2020) What is dementia? https://www.alz.org/alzheimers-
dementia/what-is-dementia. Accessed 4 Feb 2020
Alzheimer’s Society (2016) Over half of people fear dementia diagnosis, 62 per cent
think it means ‘life is over’. https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/news/2018-05-29/
over-half-people-fear-dementia-diagnosis-62-cent-think-it-means-life-over.
Accessed 5 Nov 2019
Alzheimer’s Society (2017) 5 things you should know about dementia. https://
www.alzheimers.org.uk/download/downloads/id/1739/
5_things_you_should_know_about_dementia.pdf. Accessed 1 Sept 2018
Andrews M (2019) Challenging the Alzheimer’s stigma. https://medicalxpress.com/
news/2019-09-alzheimer-stigma.html. Accessed 24 Nov 2019
Annear MJ, Toye C, Elliott KEJ et al. (2017) Dementia knowledge assessment scale
(DKAS): confirmatory factor analysis and comparative subscale scores among
an international cohort. BMC Geriatr 17(1):1–11
Apter JT, Shastri K, Pizano K (2015) Update on disease-modifying/preventive
therapies in Alzheimer’s disease. Curr Geriatr Rep 4(4):312–317
ARUK (2017) Keeping pace: progress in dementia research capacity. Alzheimer’s
Research UK, Cambridge
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01004-4 ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |           (2021) 8:320 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01004-4 9
ARUK (2019a) Samuel L. Jackson stars in powerful dementia campaign to chal-
lenge misunderstanding of condition. https://www.alzheimersresearchuk.org/
samuel-l-jackson-share-the-orange/. Accessed 4 Feb 2020
ARUK. (2019b). #ShareTheOrange. Alzheimer’s Research UK. https://
www.alzheimersresearchuk.org/orange/. Accessed 24 Oct 2019
ARUK (2020) EDoN: Early detection of neurodegenerative diseases. https://edon-
initiative.org/. Accessed 20 Feb 2020
Baker JR, Goodenough B, Jeon YH et al (2018) The Kids4Dementia education
program is effective in improving children’s attitudes towards dementia.
Dementia. https://doi.org/10.1177/1471301217731385
Ballenger JF (2006) Self, senility, and Alzheimer’s disease in modern America. The
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
Bartlett R, O’Connor D (2010) Broadening the dementia debate: towards social
citizenship. The Policy Press, Bristol
Bell S, Harkness K, Dickson JM et al. (2015) A diagnosis for £55: what is the cost of
government initiatives in dementia case finding. Age Ageing 44(2):344–345
Berchtold NC, Cotman CW (1998) Evolution in the conceptualization of dementia
and Alzheimer’s disease: Greco-Roman period to the 1960s. Neurobiol Aging
19(3):173–189
Berrios GE, Marková IS (2002) The concept of neuropsychiatry: a historical
overview. J Psychosom Res 53(2):629–638
Berwald S, Roche M, Adelman S et al. (2016) Black African and Caribbean British
communities’ perceptions of memory problems: “We don’t do dementia”.
PLoS ONE 11(4):1–15
Boller F, Forbes MM (1998) History of dementia and dementia in history: an
overview. J Neurol Sci 158(2):125–133
Bond J, Stave C, Sganga A et al. (2005) Inequalities in dementia care across Europe:
key findings of the Facing Dementia Survey. Int J Clin Pract 59:8–14
Bosco A, Schneider J, Coleston-Shields DM et al. (2019) The social construction of
dementia: systematic review and metacognitive model of enculturation.
Maturitas 120:12–22
Brayne C, Kelly S (2019) Against the stream: early diagnosis of dementia, is it so
desirable. BJPsych Bull 43(3):123–125
Burke L (2015) The locus of our dis-ease. In: Swinnen A, Schweda M (eds.)
Popularizing dementia: public expressions and representations of forgetful-
ness. Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, pp. 23–42
Burke L (2017) Imagining a future without dementia: fictions of regeneration and
the crises of work and sustainability. Palgrave Commun 3(52):1–9
Busfield J (2017) The concept of medicalisation reassessed. Sociol Health Illn
39(5):759–774
Cahill S (2020) WHO’s global action plan on the public health response to dementia:
some challenges and opportunities. Aging Mental Health 24(2):197–199
Cahill S, Pierce M, Werner P et al. (2015) A systematic review of the public’s
knowledge and understanding of Alzheimer’s disease and dementia. Alzhei-
mer Dis Assoc Disord 29(3):255–275
Castellani RJ, Smith MA (2011) Compounding artefacts with uncertainty, and an
amyloid cascade hypothesis that is ‘too big to fail’. J Pathol 224(2):147–152
Cations M, Laver KE, Crotty M et al. (2017) Rehabilitation in dementia care. Age
Ageing 47(2):171–174
Choi SK, Rose ID, Friedman DB (2018) How is literacy being defined and mea-
sured in dementia research? A scoping review. Gerontol Geriatr Med https://
doi.org/10.1177/2333721418812246
Clare L, Quinn C, Jones IR et al. (2016) “I don’t think of it as an illness”: illness
representations in mild to moderate dementia. J Alzheimer’s Dis 51(1):139–150
Cohen L (1998) No aging in India: Alzheimer’s, the bad family, and other modern
things. University of California Press, Berkeley
Cooper S (2016) Research on help-seeking for mental illness in Africa: dominant
approaches and possible alternatives. Transcult Psychiatry 53(6):696–718
Cummings J, Lee G, Ritter A et al. (2020) Alzheimer’s disease drug development
pipeline: 2020. Alzheimer’s & Dementia: Translational Research & Clinical
Interventions 6(1):1–29
Dementia Friends (2017) Dementia friends. https://www.dementiafriends.org.uk/.
Accessed 1 Sept 2018
Dementia Friends (2019) ‘So proud to be part of this number’—3 million
Dementia Friends online celebrations. https://www.dementiafriends.org.uk/
WEBNewsStory?storyId=a0B0J00000sYxwZUAS#.XcFpkkb7RhF. Accessed
5 Nov 2019
Devlin E, MacAskill S, Stead M (2007) ‘We’re still the same people’: developing a
mass media campaign to raise awareness and challenge the stigma of
dementia. Int J Nonprofit Volunt Sector Mark 12(1):47–58
Donegan K, Fox N, Black N et al. (2017) Trends in diagnosis and treatment for
people with dementia in the UK from 2005 to 2015: a longitudinal retro-
spective cohort study. Lancet Public Health 2(3):e149–e156
Falcus S, Saco K (2019) Contemporary narratives of dementia: ethics, ageing,
politics. Routledge, New York
Fletcher JR (2019) Dementia is changing. Social media arguments show us how.
https://criticalgerontology.com/dementia-changing-media/. Accessed 5 Nov
2019
Fletcher JR (2020a) Mythical dementia and Alzheimerised senility: discrepant and
intersecting representations of cognitive decline in later life. Soc Theory
Health 18(1):50–65
Fletcher JR (2020b) Ethnicity in dementia research: are social scientists complicit in
neuropsychiatric imperialism? https://www.sociologylens.net/article-types/
opinion/ethnicity-dementia-research-are-social-scientists-complicit-
neuropsychiatric-imperialism/28176. Accessed 17 Nov 2021
Fletcher JR (2020c) Positioning ethnicity in dementia awareness research: the use
of senility to ascribe cultural inadequacy. Sociol Health Illn 42(4):705–723
Fletcher JR (2021a) Destigmatising dementia: the dangers of felt stigma and ben-
evolent othering. Dementia 20(2):417–426
Fletcher JR (2021b) Black knowledges matter: how the suppression of non-white
understandings of dementia harms us all and how we can combat it. Sociol
Health Illn https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.13280
Fletcher JR, Roche M, Zubair M (2021) The neuropsychiatric biopolitics of
dementia and its ethnicity problem. Sociol Rev https://doi.org/10.1177/
00380261211059920
Folstein MF, Folstein SE, McHugh PR (1975) Mini-mental state”: a practical
method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician. J Psychiatr
Res 12(3):189–198
Fox C, Lafortune L, Boustani M et al. (2013) The pros and cons of early diagnosis
in dementia. Br J General Pract 63(612):e510–e512
Fox P (1989) From senility to Alzheimer’s disease: the rise of the Alzheimer’s
disease movement. Milbank Q 67(1):58–102
Fuller SC (1911) A study of the miliary plaques found in the brains of the aged. Am
J Insanity 68(2):147–220
Fuller SC (1912) Alzheimer’s disease (senium præcox): the report of a case and
review of published cases. J Nerv Mental Disease 39(7):440–455
Hacking I (1983) Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philo-
sophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hardy JA, Higgins GA (1992) Alzheimer’s disease: the amyloid cascade hypothesis.
Science 256(5054):184–185
Holman D (2015) Exploring the relationship between social class, mental illness
stigma and mental health literacy using British national survey data. Health
19(4):413–429
Holstein MB, Minkler M (2003) Self, society, and the “new gerontology”. Ger-
ontologist 43(6):787–796
Howard R (2017) Doubts about dementia diagnoses. Lancet Psychiatry https://
doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(17)30150-5
Hu WT (2017) No doubts about dementia advocacy. Lancet Psychiatry https://
doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(17)30373-5
Hudson JM, Pollux PM, Mistry B et al. (2012) Beliefs about Alzheimer’s disease in
Britain. Aging Mental Health 16(7):828–835
Innes A (2009) Dementia studies: a social science perspective. SAGE, London
Kirmayer LJ, Lemelson R, Cummings CA (2015) Re-visioning psychiatry: cultural
phenomenology, critical neuroscience, and global mental health. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Kutcher S, Wei Y, Coniglio C (2016) Mental health literacy: past, present, and
future. Can J Psychiatry 61(3):154–158
Le Couteur DG, Doust J, Creasey H et al. (2013) Political drive to screen for pre-
dementia: not evidence based and ignores the harms of diagnosis. BMJ 347:f5125
Lo C (2018) Cracking the mystery of Alzheimer’s disease. https://pharma.nridigital.com/
pharma_apr18/cracking_the_mystery_of_alzheimer_s_disease. Accessed 9 Sept
2021
Lock M (2013) The Alzheimer conundrum: entanglements of dementia and aging.
Princeton University Press, Princeton
Low LF, Anstey KJ (2009) Dementia literacy: recognition and beliefs on dementia
of the Australian public. Alzheimer’s Dement 5(1):43–49
Lüdecke D, von dem Knesebeck O, Kofahl C (2016) Public knowledge about
dementia in Germany—results of a population survey. Int J Public Health
61(1):9–16
Manthorpe J, Iliffe S (2016) The dialectics of dementia. Policy Institute at King’s,
London
Martin P (2015) Commercialising neurofutures: promissory economies, value
creation and the making of a new industry. BioSocieties 10(4):422–443
Martinson M, Berridge C (2014) Successful aging and its discontents: a systematic
review of the social gerontology literature. Gerontologist 55(1):58–69
McParland P, Devine P, Innes A et al. (2012) Dementia knowledge and attitudes of
the general public in Northern Ireland: an analysis of national survey data. Int
Psychogeriatr 24(10):1600–1613
Meeks S (2020) Neuro-crime fiction: detecting cognitive difference. Crime Fict Stud
1(1):79–95
Mills C (2014) Decolonizing global mental health: the psychiatrization of the
majority world. Routlegde, Hove
Mills C, Hilberg E (2019) ‘Built for expansion’: the ‘social life’of the WHO’s mental
health GAP Intervention Guide. Soc Health Illn 41(S1):162–175
Milne A (2010) Dementia screening and early diagnosis: the case for and against.
Health Risk Soc 12(1):65–76
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01004-4
10 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |           (2021) 8:320 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01004-4
Morano CL, King MD (2010) Lessons learned from implementing a psycho-
educational intervention for African American dementia caregivers. Dementia
9(4):558–568
NHS (2020) Dementia guide: about dementia. https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
dementia/about/. Accessed 18 Feb 2020
NIH (2019) The dementias: hope through research. https://www.ninds.nih.gov/
Disorders/Patient-Caregiver-Education/Hope-Through-Research/Dementia-
Hope-Through-Research. Accessed 24 Oct 2019
Noble JM, Hedmann MG, Williams O (2015) Improving dementia health literacy
using the FLOW mnemonic: pilot findings from the Old SCHOOL hip-hop
program. Health Educ Behav 42(1):73–83
Parveen S, Robins J, Griffiths AW et al. (2015) Dementia detectives: busting the
myths. J Dement Care 23(4):12–13
Petersen A, Krisjansen I (2015) Assembling ‘the bioeconomy’: exploiting the power
of the promissory life sciences. J Sociol 51(1):28–46
Pickersgill M (2013) The social life of the brain: neuroscience in society. Curr
Sociol 61(3):322–340
Prince M, Ali GC, Guerchet M, Prina AM et al. (2016) Recent global trends in the
prevalence and incidence of dementia, and survival with dementia. Alzhei-
mer’s Res Ther 8(23):1–13
Prince M, Ferri CP, Acosta D et al. (2007) The protocols for the 10/66 dementia research
group population-based research programme. BMC Public Health 7(165):1–18
Purandare N, Luthra V, Swarbrick C et al. (2007) Knowledge of dementia among
South Asian (Indian) older people in Manchester, UK. Int J Geriatr Psy-
chiatry 22(8):777–781
Quinn C, Jones IR, Clare L (2017) Illness representations in caregivers of people
with dementia. Aging Mental Health 21(5):553–561
Quinn C, Morris RG, Clare L (2018) Beliefs about dementia: development and
validation of the Representations and Adjustment to Dementia Index
(RADIX). Am J Geriatr Psychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jagp.2018.02.004
Rimmer E, Stave C, Sganga A et al. (2005) Implications of the Facing Dementia
Survey for policy makers and third-party organisations across Europe. Int J
Clin Pract 59:34–38
Roberts JS, McLaughlin SJ, Connell CM (2014) Public beliefs and knowledge about
risk and protective factors for Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s Dement
10(5):S381–S389
Robinson A, Eccleston C, Annear M et al. (2014) Who knows, who cares?
Dementia knowledge among nurses, care workers, and family members of
people living with dementia. J Palliat Care 30(3):158–165
Romesburg CH (2004) Cluster analysis for researchers. Lulu Press, North Carolina
Rose N (2019) Our psychiatric future. Polity, Cambridge
Rose N, Abi-Rached J (2013) Neuro: the new brain sciences and the management
of the mind. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Sachdev PS, Mohan A (2013) Neuropsychiatry: where are we and where do we go
from here? Mens Sana Monogr 11(1):4–15
Samsi K, Manthorpe J (2014) Care pathways for dementia: current perspectives.
Clin Interv Aging 9:2055–2063
Shinan-Altman S, Werner P (2019) Illness representations of dementia: a scoping
review. Clin Interv Aging 14:179–193
Simis MJ, Madden H, Cacciatore MA et al. (2016) The lure of rationality: why does
the deficit model persist in science communication? Public Underst Sci
25(4):400–414
Spector A, Orrell M, Schepers A et al. (2012) A systematic review of ‘knowledge of
dementia’ outcome measures. Ageing Res Rev 11(1):67–77
Swinnen A, Schweda M (2015) Public expressions and representations of forgetfulness.
In: Swinnen A, Schweda M (eds.) Popularizing dementia: public expressions and
representations of forgetfulness. Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, pp. 9–22
Templeton L (2019) 95% of people think they could develop dementia with age. https://
www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/326492.php#1. Accessed 24 Oct 2019
Valle R, Yamada AM, Matiella AC (2006) Fotonovelas: a health literacy tool for
educating Latino older adults about dementia. Clin Gerontol 30(1):71–88
Vidal F, Ortega F (2017) Being brains: making the cerebral subject. Fordham
University Press, New York
Watson R, Bryant J, Sanson-Fisher R et al. (2018) What is a ‘timely’ diagnosis?
Exploring the preferences of Australian health service consumers regarding
when a diagnosis of dementia should be disclosed. BMC Health Serv Res
18(612):1–9
Weiner K, Martin P, Richards M et al. (2017) Have we seen the geneticisation of
society? Expectations and evidence. Sociol Health Illn 39(7):989–1004
WHO (2012) Dementia: a public health priority—online appendix. https://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/75262/WHO_NMH_MSD_2012.3_
eng.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 6 Nov 2019
WHO (2015) Dementia: a public health priority. https://www.who.int/mental_health/
neurology/dementia/dementia_thematicbrief_executivesummary.pdf. Accessed
6 Nov 2019
WHO (2019) 10 facts on dementia. https://www.who.int/features/factfiles/
dementia/en/. Accessed 6 Nov 2019i
Williams SJ, Higgs P, Katz S (2012) Neuroculture, active ageing and the ‘older
brain’: problems, promises and prospects. Sociol Health Illn 34(1):64–78
Wilson D (2014) Quantifying the quiet epidemic: diagnosing dementia in late 20th-
century Britain. Hist Hum Sci 27(5):126–146
Zeilig H (2014) Dementia as a cultural metaphor. Gerontologist 54(2):258–267
Zhang Y (2018) Governing dementia: a historical investigation of the power of
states and professionals in the conceptualization of dementia in China. Cult
Med Psychiatry 42(4):862–892
Acknowledgements
This work was partly funded by the Wellcome Trust (grant number 222193/Z/20/Z). The
authors would like to thank Martin Hyde and Rasmus Birk for providing feedback on
earlier drafts.
Author contributions
Both authors made substantial contributions to the conception of the work, the acqui-
sition, analysis, and interpretation of data for the work, drafting the work and revising it
critically for important intellectual content. Both authors approve this final version to be
published and agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that
questions related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately
investigated and resolved.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Additional information
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to James Rupert
Fletcher.
Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/reprints
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party
material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless
indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
© The Author(s) 2021
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01004-4 ARTICLE
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |           (2021) 8:320 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01004-4 11
